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THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE. By Stuart 
S. Nagel. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 399. $8.50. 
Because Stuart Nagel's The Legal Process from a Behavioral 
Perspective uses the tools of one discipline to analyze the operation 
of another, it should prove highly valuable to scholars in both fields. 
Lawyers can gain from this text a more sophisticated appreciation 
for the developing behavioral science of law and for the application 
of current social-science methodologies to legal research. Social scien-
tists, on the other hand, can derive a better comprehension of the 
policy capabilities of this country's legal "delivery system." 
Professor Nagel, a member of the Illinois Bar, belongs to a group 
of highly productive and gifted political scientists whose scholarship 
has given significant new directions to the study of public law. He 
and his fellow scholars-Jack Peltason,1 C.H. Pritchett,2 Sid Ulmer,8 
Glendon Schubert,4 Fred Kort,5 and Joe Tanenhaus6 are but a few 
of the leading names-insist that, since judges function as actors in 
our political system, the role of the judiciary in the making of law 
constitutes a form of political decision-making. Therefore, they be-
lieve that the actions of judges should be viewed, methodologically, 
in behavioral-political rather than traditionally legal terms, even 
though such actions may differ in style and process from those of 
legislatures or executives. 
To many members of the legal profession, however, the concept 
of a political jurisprudence-a joining of politics and law-conjurs 
up connotations that are far from appealing. "Law is a prestigious 
symbol, whereas politics tends to be a dirty word," acknowledges 
C. H. Pritchett, one of the founding fathers of the behavioral ap-
proach to judicial research. "Law is stability; politics is chaos. Law 
is impersonal; politics is personal. Law is given; politics is free 
choice. Law is reason; politics is prejudice and self-interest. Law is 
justice; politics is who gets there first with the most. The motto over 
I. J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE PoLmCAL PROCESS (1955); J. PELTASON, 
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961). 
2. C. PRITCHE1T, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL PoLmcs AND VALUES, 
1937-1947 (1948); C. PRITCHE1T, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954). 
3. INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN POLmCAL BEHAVIOR (S. Ulmer ed. 1969). 
4. G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PoLmCAL BEHAVIOR (1960); G. SCHUBERT, 
JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE PoLmCAL ROLE OF THE COURTS (1965); G. SCHUBERT, Tm: 
JUDICIAL MIND (1965); JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (G. Schubert ed. 1963); JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND REsEARCH (G. Schubert ed. 1964); G. SCHUBERT 8: D. 
DANELSKI, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1969). 
5. Kort, Simultaneous Equation and Boolean Algebra, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: 
A READER IN THEORY AND REsEARCH 477 (G. Schubert ed. 1964). 
(i. fRONTµ;RS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (J. Grossman 8: J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969). 
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the portals of the Supreme Court building is, 'Equal Justice Under 
Law,' not 'Equal Justice Under Politics.' "7 
The behaviorists nevertheless maintain that law is not so totally 
divorced from politics. They view judges as participants in the 
making of public policy, and therefore as part of the political process. 
This behavioral perspective on public law, which has strongly de-
veloped since World War II, represents a reaction to what has been 
somewhat pejoratively termed the "slot machine jurisprudence" ap-
proach to constitutional law. Thus, Nagel and his colleagues see that 
judges do not merely discover law; they make law. Judges do not 
merely follow mechanical precedents; they select those precedents 
most appropriate to the ends that they believe reflect just and 
socially desirable policy. 
But this is not to say that contemporary behaviorists are merely 
ideological descendants of the school of judicial realism-as first 
propounded by Cardozo, Jerome Frank, Brandeis, and Pound. Be-
cause behaviorists also are strongly influenced by studies in sociology, 
psychology, psychoanalysis, and the application of mathematics to 
the social sciences, they seek a political jurisprudence which employs 
empirical and quantitative studies in order to build testable theories 
within a behaviorally oriented science of politics. To achieve this 
goal, the behaviorists emphasize methodologies which point up the 
interdisciplinary nature of contemporary public-law research, the 
need for greater precision in the quantification of data, and the 
employment of increasingly sophisticated statistical tools. Their 
specific aim is to elucidate scientific relationships between the back-
grounds and attitudes of judges and judicial decision-making, and 
thus to develop general models or theories for predicting decisional 
outcomes within a "stimulus-response" conceptual context. 
In The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective, Professor 
Nagel brings together more than twenty of his studies that utilize 
this approach, most of which were published previously in various 
legal and social-science journals. The book includes a number of 
chapters illustrating the application of the behavioral approach to 
research. Among the topics explored are the exercise of discretion 
by various federal administrative tribunals in rule-making proceed-
ings, decisional influences of state and federal courts upon each 
other as revealed in Shepard's Citations, the influence of cultural 
patterns upon the adjudicative processes, the extent of favorable and 
unfavorable treatment received by identifiable groups of litigants-
classed by sex, race, age, and education-in the various stages of 
criminal proceedings, and the relationships between "attorney char-
acteristics" and courtroom results. Three chapters are devoted to the 
7. Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in id., at 31. 
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use of correlation-analysis methods, demonstrating how they can be 
used to predict the decisional outcomes of cases involving criminal 
confessions, reapportionment, and civil liberties. 
Discussions of judicial "decisional propensities" include studies 
relating judicial backgrounds-ethnicity, religion, education, and 
ideology-to outcomes in criminal cases; methods of judicial recruit-
ment-election or appointment-to party loyalty; and background 
variables-including political party, region of country, and ideology 
of appointing authority-to "conservative or liberal decisional direc-
tions" of seven federal regulatory commissions. A number of atti-
tudinal surveys are reported which seem to point to a tendency for 
judges with conservative responses "to decide for the prosecution in 
criminal cases, for the business firm in business regulation cases, for 
the party sued in auto accident cases, and for the employer in work-
men's compensation cases" (p. 218). 
In addition to these studies of reactions of the legal system to 
various phenomena, the author has included several studies which 
examine political reactions to judicial decisions. One such study 
quantitatively measures congressional reaction to judicial review by 
isolating and analyzing factors and issues that exhibit positive cor-
relation with court-curbing bills. Another analyzes major editorial 
reaction to "church and state" cases in order to discern variables 
that might help to account for differences in response patterns. 
Methodological problems encountered in systematically testing le-
gal effects are further illustrated in a study which examines the 
effects and impact of the exclusionary rule established by the Su-
preme Court in Mapp v. Ohio8 on police, judicial, and criminal 
behavior. 
The material presented in the last two chapters is less directly 
related to the author's central discussion of the applications of be-
haviorally oriented research methods to the judicial process. Chapter 
24 contains a computer program for use by legislatures engaged in 
redistricting. This program is designed to reconcile reapportionment 
policy considerations-such as district compactness, contiguity, and 
maximization of political interests-with the one man-one vote 
imperative. Professor Nagel's last chapter, "Optimizing Legal Policy," 
attempts to employ "estimated correlation coefficients to determine 
the relation of policies to goals and paired comparisons to weight 
goals, and to determine the likelihood that a policy will be adopted" 
(p. 360). Quantifying the "ideal" strategy options in the legislative 
process in order to determine which set of policies has the greatest 
chance of overcoming opposition forces represents an important 
and practical research objective for social scientists. Nagel presents 
a scheme for optimizing the probability that socially useful legisla-
s. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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tion will be adopted, which he recommends "wherever it can be 
applied in part or in whole" (p. 373) for use not only when the vari-
ables may be ascertained with quantitative certainty, but also when 
they can only be estimated. The method is thus designed more as a 
stimulus for further analysis of legislative problems than as a fixed 
formula for deriving proven solutions. 
Whether assessed from the perspective of the "newer" political 
science or from that of the "newer" public law, Nagel's concept of 
law-making and adjudication "as both effects or outputs and as causes 
or inputs" reflects quite accurately the thrust toward a unified so-
cial science of law, that dominates contemporary behaviorist re-
search and writing. One of the major merits of this closely reasoned 
book is the author's success in combining his own numerous investi-
gations and the research of others into one logically and systemat-
ically integrated work. This integration was especially important 
because Nagel chose to include some of his earlier and possibly some-
what dated studies. The book's shortcomings, on the other hand, are 
relatively minor. Broader comparative system-type approaches to 
the legal process received only limited attention.9 Moreover, the 
book's readability might have been enhanced had the conceptual 
discussions been more clearly separated from the methodological 
detail. 
Despite these insignificant problems, The Legal Process from a 
Behavioral Perspective offers a significant contribution to the disci-
pline of behavioral analysis of the legal system. It constitutes a most 
scholarly and articulate plea for the construction of more scienti-
fically precise and empirically verifiable principles of judicial deci-
sion-making. There are, of course, legal scholars who continue to 
express serious reservations about the adequacy of the behavioral 
approach as a method of providing a meaningful guide to the sub-
jective world of judges. For example, Professor Schwartz10 has urged 
that a series of important questions, posed by Cardozo more than a 
generation ago, should continue to challenge the building of reliable 
predictive models, especially as the questions relate to a judge's per-
ception of his judicial role under particular sets of circumstances and 
conditions: 
What is it I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information 
do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them 
to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to con-
tribute? I£ a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? 
If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will 
make a precedent for the future? I£ I am seeking logical consistency, 
9. In this connection see G. SCHUBERT &: D. DANELSKI, supra note 4. 
10. Schwartz, A Proposed Focus for Research on ]udidal Behavior, in J. Grossman 
&: J. Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 490. 
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the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what 
point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some 
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common 
standards of justice and morals?11 
It is doubtful that Professor Nagel would quarrel with the relevancy 
of these questions, but he clearly believes that their seemingly sub-
jective nature will not render behavioral analysis unproductive. 
Rather, Nagel-more than traditionally inclined members of the bar 
and bench-is confident that, as data bases grow and quantitative 
research techniques become more sophisticated, he and his fellow 
behaviorists will derive verifiable generalizations concerning the 
legal process. 
G. Theodore Mitau, 
Chancellor, 
Minnesota State College System, 
and 
Adjunct Professor of Political Science, 
Macalester College 
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